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Summary
With the adoption of Article 6 of the Paris 
Agreement, former debates about generating 
carbon credits on the basis of national policies 
have resurged. National policies have not been 
eligible as project activities under the Kyoto 
Protocol’s flexible mechanisms. The Paris 
Agreement opens the possibility for such policy 
crediting but also provides an entirely new con­
text: Universal participation, ambitious long­
term targets and nationally defined contribu­
tions (NDCs) that are to be made more ambi­
tious over time. As this paper shows, these 
changes in the framework conditions add an 
additional layer of complexity to policy-based 
cooperation.
The authors explore the potential for policy­
based cooperation by first briefly presenting 
the regulatory basis provided by the Paris 
Agreement before outlining a prototype for 
policy-based cooperation and its key challeng­
es. These are explored in greater detail by ana­
lysing the applicability of three policy instru­
ments: Renewable energy feed-in tariffs, energy 
efficiency (white) certificates trading schemes,
and building codes combined with funding in­
struments. 
The analysis finds that policy-based coopera­
tion is associated with significant challenges.
Ensuring the additionality of policies was found 
to be particularly challenging given the strong 
co-benefits of many policies and taking into ac­
count that the Paris Agreement requires Parties 
to raise their ambition over time, limiting the 
scope for additional policies. At the same time,
there is practical evidence showing that coun­
tries’ progress in implementing climate policies 
is insufficient, despite there being significant 
no-regret options.
This shows that there is a need for external 
support, which could be provided through Arti­
cle 6. Alternatively, it could be provided as pub­
lic climate finance, which would pose fewer ac­
counting challenges. In any case, such support 
should be temporary and only target the initial
phase of introducing policies or increasing their 
ambition level. Support should then be phased­
out and the mitigation measures transferred 
under the domestic responsibility of the host 
country.
The authors also suggest exploring input-based 
transfers, where the amount of ITMOs to be 
transferred would be determined on the basis 
of the support provided, not on the basis of the 
results achieved. Such direct government-to­
government transfers would allow focus to be 
placed on the ambition level of NDCs as a key 
determinant of ensuring the environmental in­
tegrity of cooperation. It might also have the 
potential to better align the support provided 
under Article 6 with climate finance contribu­
tions. In conjunction, both these support 
measures could, in a stepwise approach, place 
emission sources and the respective mitigation 











   
Policy-based Cooperation under Article 6 
1 Introduction 

Article 6 of Paris Agreement allows Parties to 
cooperate internationally in achieving their 
nationally determined contributions (NDCs).
In contrast to the mechanisms of the Kyoto 
Protocol, cooperation under Article 6 may be 
based not only on projects and programmes,
but also on national policies. This would pro­
vide the potential to achieve emission reduc­
tions at scale while also supporting countries 
in implementing transformative policies.  
While expectations on such forms of scaled­
up market-based cooperation are high, so are 
the concerns: The experience gained with 
project-based crediting under the Kyoto Pro­
tocol’s Clean Development Mechanism and 
Joint Implementation are mixed and policy­
based cooperation is still largely uncharted 
territory. 
The objective of the paper is to fill this void
by sketching out how market-based coopera­
tion under Article 6 (6.2 or 6.4) could be used 
to co-finance and support national mitigation 
policies. This is to provide insights into which
kinds of instruments are best-suited for poli­
cy-based activities in the Article 6 context 
and how cooperation could function. 
This paper therefore first looks at the frame­
work conditions for market-based coopera­
tion provided by the Paris Agreement. It then 
outlines the key steps of prototypical policy­
based cooperation under Article 6 before 
delving into some of the key challenges. In a 
next step, the paper analyses three different 
policies and explores how cooperation could 
look like: It first looks at how, as one of the 
most successful policies in fostering the de­
ployment of renewables, renewable energy 
feed-in tariffs could be used for cooperation 
under Article 6.
Moving on, the paper then looks at energy 
efficiency (white) certificates trading schemes 
in order to explore linking as a specific policy­
based form of cooperation under Article 6.
Finally, with energy efficiency (EE) measures 
in buildings holding vast, yet largely unex­
ploited mitigation potential, the paper anal­
yses how building codes that are combined 
with a funding instrument could be used as a 
basis for Article 6 cooperation.
In the analysis of each of these instruments, 
we explore how such a cooperation activity 
could look like and zoom into specific issues 
such as additionality demonstration and 
baseline setting. Following these analyses,
the paper discusses the main findings and 
provides some concluding remarks on the 
potential future role of policy-based coopera­
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2 Framework conditions for 
policy-based cooperation
2.1 From Kyoto to Paris 
Until now, crediting of mitigation activities 
has been limited to individual projects or 
programmes while crediting of policies was 
excluded. Under the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM), the question of whether 
to allow crediting of policies was a point of 
contention at a very early stage (Samaniago 
and Figueres 2002; Sterk and Wittneben 
2005). At its meeting in November 2005, the 
CDM Executive Board could not resolve the 
issue and forwarded it to the CMP (UNFCCC 
2005, para 22), who decided that “a local / re­
gional / national policy cannot be considered 
as a clean development mechanisms project 
activity” (Decision 7/CMP.1, para 20, UNFCCC 
2006).
The debate about crediting national policies 
resurged with the introduction of “nationally
appropriate mitigation actions” (NAMAs) – a 
concept that was introduced with the Bali Ac­
tion Plan in 2007 to accommodate the fact 
that developing countries were not willing to 
engage in the same kind of mitigation com­
mitments as developed countries. NAMAs are 
to be implemented by developing countries 
in the “context of sustainable development,
supported and enabled by technology, fi­
nancing and capacity-building, in a measura­
ble, reportable and verifiable manner“ (Deci­
sion 1.CP13, para 1 (b)(ii), UNFCCC 2008).
Soon proposals were put on the table that 
suggested that NAMAs could be financed 
through crediting. An early proponent of this
approach was the Republic of Korea with its 
proposal to incentivise NAMAs by awarding 
carbon credits (Republic of Korea 2008).
This and other proposals on policy crediting 
also found their way into the debate about 
the up-scaling of the CDM and the develop­
ment of new market mechanisms (Sterk et al.
2015). Discussions about reforming the CDM
and installing new mechanisms with a reach 
going beyond individual projects were held
against the background of the CDM’s limited 
success in inducing a broader sectoral
change in its host countries. Developing and 
testing sectoral approaches was hence also 
one of the recommendations of the CDM Pol­
icy Dialogue, a discussion process on the fu­
ture of the CDM initiated by the CDM Execu­
tive Board (CDM Policy Dialogue 2012).
These debates can inform our deliberation 
about policy-based cooperation under Article 
6 of the Paris Agreement. However, climate 
policy-making after 2020 will take place un­
der circumstances that deviate significantly 
from the pre-Paris situation.
First: Universal participation. All Parties will 
have to prepare and communicate NDCs they 
intend to achieve and implement domestic 
mitigation measures aimed at achieving 
those NDCs (Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Article 
4.2 UNFCCC 2016). This clearly limits the un­
capped environment, historically the largest 
source of mitigation options for crediting ac­
tivities. 
Second: Ambition raising. Parties are required 
to increase the ambition level of their nation­
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1/CP.21, Annex, Article 4.3 UNFCCC 2016) and 
their mitigation actions. 
Third: Ambitious global long-term tempera­
ture goals that require transformational activ­
ities to be implemented (Decision 1/CP.21, 
Annex, Article 2 UNFCCC 2016). In the con­
text of NAMA crediting, critics maintained
that the focus on direct and short-term GHG 
reductions inherent to market-based ap­
proaches could be incompatible with the in­
tended transformative nature of NAMAs 
(Röser and de Vit 2012). 
These changes in the framework conditions 
add an additional layer of complexity to poli­
cy-based cooperation and make it more diffi­
cult to address some of the key challenges 
that were already left unanswered in previ­
ous debate. Before focusing on these chal­
lenges, we will in the following look at how
policy-based cooperation could look like un­
der Article 6. 
2.2 Article 6 basics and rule­
book assumptions 
Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement allows Par­
ties to cooperate internationally in achieving 
their nationally determined contributions by 
exchanging “internationally transferred miti­
gation outcomes” (ITMOs). The Paris Agree­
ment does not envisage international gov­
ernance overseeing these transfers but 
requires Parties to adhere to some overarch­
ing principles (ensure environmental integri­
ty and transparency, promote sustainable 
development, avoid double counting) and to 
be consistent with “guidance” adopted by 
the CPA.
Article 6.4 establishes a “mechanism to con­
tribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas 
emissions and support sustainable develop­
ment”. This mechanism, which will be super­
vised by an international body, is to generate 
emission reductions that can be used by Par­
ties other than the originating Party to fulfil 
their nationally determined contributions. 
However, some important provisions are still 
to be fleshed out by the negotiators in order 
to find their way into the Paris rulebook.
Against this background and in order to al­
low for a discussion of how policy-based co­
operation could look like, some assumptions 
on outstanding issues to be regulated by the 
Paris rulebook will be made. 
Relationship between Article 6.2 and Article 
6.4: In our view, Article 6.2 could serve as an 
overarching accounting framework which 
could also be used for transfers of mitigation 
outcomes generated under Article 6.4. Since 
it is still unclear whether the Article 6.4 
mechanism will issue some kind of certifi­
cates or units, we will use the term ITMO for 
any mitigation outcomes generated under 
Article 6, both the mechanism under Article 
6.4 and Article 6.2, that are internationally 
transferred. 
A question closely related to this is the nature 
of ITMOs. To allow for maximum fungibility, 
we will assume that ITMOs will be defined in
terms of CO2e only. Another point is the 
origin of ITMOs: We assume that ITMOs can
be generated within and outside the scope of
a Party’s NDC. 
A particular point of contention is the poten­
tial eligibility of NDCs: In light of the chal­
lenges associated with non-GHG targets, we 
will in the following assume that eligibility of 
using Article 6 is limited to Parties that have 
adopted a quantified NDC expressed in terms 
of CO2e, be it a multi-year or a single year tar­
get.
In terms of accounting we expect that origi­
nating Parties will have to make correspond­
ing adjustments for ITMOs that are used 
against the investor Party’s NDC. Correspond­
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justing the NDC target (target-based ac­
counting) or the emissions (emissions-based 
accounting) (see: OECD and IEA 2017).
2.3 Forms of policy-based co­
operation under Article 6  
So how do the basics provided by Article 6 
relate to policy-based cooperation and how 
could such cooperation look like under the 
Paris Agreement? While the export of ITMOs 
does not necessarily require financial flows 
and transfers, it can be expected to involve 
some kind of conditionality, usually in the 
form of financial support. Different forms of 
cooperation can be envisaged, including 
simple government-to-government transfers 
as well as some sort of activity-based credit­
ing following the pattern known from the 
Kyoto Protocol. These are, however, not part 
of this study, which focuses purely on policy­
based activities. For the sake of simplicity we 
assume that only two countries are involved 
in the cooperation and that emission reduc­
tions flow only in one direction (from Party A 
to B), while funds flow in the opposite direc­
tion. 
2.3.1 Policy crediting 
One form of policy-based cooperation under 
Article 6 could be bilateral policy support:
Party A assists Party B in introducing and im­
plementing a national climate policy instru­
ment by providing financial assistance. In ex­
change for the support provided, Party A 
receives (a portion of) the emission reduc­
tions achieved by the national climate policy 
of Party B, which it can use for NDC attain­
ment (offsetting), ambition raising or for cli­
mate finance. While similar to government­
to-government transfers, the emission reduc­
tions transferred are contingent on the re­
sults of the specific policy. Policy crediting is 
also possible if the policy has already been 
introduced: In this case, Party A assists Party B 
in increasing the ambition of the policy con­
cerned. 
2.3.2 Policy linking 
A second form of policy-based cooperation is
(full or partial) linking of national climate pol­
icies. Under this scenario, the national policy 
instrument of Party B is linked to that of Party 
A. Entities (companies, installations) covered 
by the national climate policy of Party A can 
use emission reductions generated through 
the climate policy of Party B in exchange for 
financial means. Each policy contributes to 
achieving the NDC of its respective Party,
which is to contribute to the achievement of 
the Paris Agreement targets. 
2.4 Prototypical policy-based 
cooperation 
Based on the project cycle of market-based 
mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol and 
work undertaken by WRI (Rich et al. 2014), we 
propose a prototypical step-wise process for 
policy-based cooperation (see Table 1 be­
low). The cooperation activities can be divid­
ed into 5 phases and 15 steps.
 4 
 
Phases Steps Generic description 
1 Design 1 Definition and delimi-
tation of the policy in
tervention and its ef
fects 
In this first step, the host party and the investor party define the policy 
that will be subject to the cooperation effort. They agree on what 
changes will be considered an impact of the intervention (causal 
chain) and define the boundaries of the intervention.  
2 Additionality demon
stration 
The host Party demonstrates that the policy instrument would not 
have been introduced/implemented without the cooperation under 
Article 6.  
3 Definition of baseline  
scenario and emissions 
The host Party defines what the baseline scenario is and estimates the 
baseline emissions. The investor Party agrees a baseline as a basis for 
calculating emission reductions.  
4 Ex ante estimate of 
mitigation impact  
By comparing the ex-ante baseline with the expected effect of the pol
icy, the ex ante mitigation impact of the policy is estimated. The ex
ante mitigation impact could be used as a basis for the cooperation 
effort, for instance by linking the support provided by the investor 
Party to (a share of) the expected outcome. 
5 Development of the 
monitoring plan 
The host Party and the investor Party agree on a monitoring plan.  
6 Determining the share
out of mitigation out
comes 
The host Party and the investor Party define how the mitigation out
comes will be shared. 
7 Validation Documents are validated by an independent third party. 
8 Registration The policy-based cooperation is registered in a public (international or 





9 Monitoring The host Party must monitor the emission reduction activity impact. 




10 Ex post calculation of 
mitigation impact 
Updated baseline emissions are compared with monitored emissions 
and adapted to account for uncertainty and undesired impacts such 
as rebound effects. 
11 Verification Reports are verified by independent third entities (not the buyer).  
12 Reporting The host Party submits verified reports to international level.  
13 Issuance International level issues credits on the basis of verified emission re
ductions. This step might only be required for cooperation under Arti




14 Transfer The host Party transfers the ITMOs to the acquiring Party. 
5 Use of 
MOs 
15 Accounting Both Parties make corresponding adjustments to their emissions or 
NDC target level according to the ITMOs transferred. 
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3 Challenges
 
3.1 Ensuring additionality of 
policies 
Additionality is a concept that has been rele­
vant in the context of international market­
based cooperation from the very start as it is
particularly prevalent in project-based offset­
ting activities under Kyoto Protocol’s Clean 
Development Mechanism. And while the Par­
is Agreement is fundamentally different from 
the Kyoto Protocol in many respects, addi­
tionality (including in the context of policy­
based cooperation) will retain its relevance 
for two key reasons: 
First, in the context of offsetting, meaning 
the use of emission reductions generated 
abroad to achieve a mitigation target, addi­
tionality must be ensured to safeguard envi­
ronmental integrity. Crediting of non­
additional activities leads to an increase of 
global emissions if ITMOs are used for NDC 
attainment. Under the Paris Agreement, this 
risk will partially be addressed by the re­
quirement to implement ‘corresponding ad­
justments’: For every ITMO transferred, the 
host Party will have to adjust its emissions (or 
its NDC). Hence, in principle, ITMOs generat­
ed by non-additional activities cannot ad­
versely impact environmental integrity as 
they are backed by respective additions to 
the emissions of the transferring country (or 
by an increase of the mitigation target). In
practice, however, non-additionality may un­
dermine environmental integrity in cases 
where activities are not covered by an NDC at 
all or when they are covered by an NDC that 
is lacking ambition (‘hot air’).
Second, additionality may also be relevant in
the context of climate finance, to avoid ineffi­
cient allocation of funding. Non-additionality 
of supported activities is problematic from an 
investor country perspective because fund­
ing activities that would have been imple­
mented anyway are a waste of scarce re­
sources. Hence, additionality must also be 
ensured for activities supported by public
climate finance.
3.1.1	 Potential approaches for ensur­
ing additionality of policies 
The CDM has developed numerous method­
ologies and tools to demonstrate additionali­
ty. These, however, are intended to demon­
strate additionality at the level of individual 
projects and programmes. In the following,
the applicability of some of these approaches 
to policies is discussed.1 
Investment analysis 
Investment analysis is the approach most 
commonly used under the CDM to demon­
strate additionality. There are three ways to 
conduct the investment analysis.
In the simple cost analysis, project propo­
nents show that at least one scenario is less 
costly. The approach is rarely applied under 
the CDM and is only suitable for projects that 
have no other revenues than the emission 
credits. In terms of additionality of policies, its 
applicability will presumably be limited to 
policies that do not provide benefits in addi­
tion to the mitigation outcomes – such as  
1 Other approaches are: common practice analysis, pri­
or consideration, use of default values, performance 
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policies targeting the reduction of industrial
gases – as these policies have limited non­
climate benefits.
The investment comparison analysis com­
pares the economic attractiveness of the pol­
icy (without revenues from credits) with al­
ternatives providing similar outputs or 
services. This approach is rarely used under 
the CDM (Cames et al. 2016). In the context of 
demonstrating the additionality of policies,
investment comparison analysis could be 
used in cases where governments are con­
ducting impact assessments to identify the 
most promising approach to achieve a pre­
defined target. Consider, for instance, a na­
tional government that explores options to 
meet its future electricity demand by com­
paring a situation in which this demand is
satisfied with fossil fuel-based energy or re­
newable energy. This assessment could in­
clude a simulation of policies that compares 
the respective investments needed. Govern­
ments could build on these impact assess­
ments and simulations in order to demon­
strate the additional need for external 
support. If, however, such impact assess­
ments are not part of the ongoing policy pro­
cess, the potential of using an investment 
comparison analysis seems limited, as it 
would require a cumbersome simulation of 
other policies. 
The benchmark analysis is the most common 
form of investment analysis used under the 
CDM (Cames et al. 2016). It allows project 
proponents to show that the prospective 
project would not be financially viable with­
out the revenues from CERs as it does not 
meet a previously defined financial bench­
mark. The benchmark analysis seems a prom­
ising approach for conducting an investment 
analysis of policies. To be robust, however, it 
would require the definition of these bench­
marks at the international level, which could
be politically cumbersome.  
More generally, the applicability of the in­
vestment analysis to policies suffers from the 
fact that policies, even more than project ac­
tivities, are not only driven by economic fac­
tors because some mitigation activities are 
associated with strong non-climate benefits.
These co-benefits would have to be factored 
in when applying an investment analysis. It is 
disputed whether such co-benefits can be 
robustly quantified and monetized. Another 
aspect that makes it questionable to include 
co-benefits in the investment analysis is that 
it is unclear whether policymakers do actually 
believe in the generation of these co-benefits 
(see: Michaelowa and Butzengeiger 2017).
Another factor which exacerbates the appli­
cation of the investment analysis to policies is 
that Parties are now bound to the Paris 
Agreement: The idea of a policy being con­
sidered additional if its costs exceed its co­
benefits builds on the assumption that the 
host country has no genuine interest in im­
plementing climate change mitigation 
measures. This assumption might (partially) 
hold for a CDM-like scenario in which all mit­
igation outcomes are exported and where 
the host country has no (future) obligations 
to mitigate climate change. Its suitability un­
der the Paris Agreement, however, is ques­
tionable as today’s mitigation activities will 
impact future mitigation potential. On the 
one hand, externally financed mitigation ac­
tivities could reduce low-cost mitigation po­
tential in the future – potential which the 
host countries might want to keep to achieve 
their own NDCs (see also: Warnecke et al. 
2018). On the other hand, today’s mitigation 
activities might create the preconditions for 
tapping mitigation potential at lower costs in
the future, for example by creating capacities 
and stimulating technological learning. 
As shown, an investment analysis would have 
to account for the non-climate impacts and 
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tential in the host Party and is therefore asso­
ciated with significant challenges.
For regulatory policies that mandate a certain 
efficiency level of a technology, Michaelowa 
and Butzengeiger (2017) suggest using pay­
back period thresholds to assess the addi­
tionality. The payback period threshold is
used as a proxy for the opposition of indus­
trial lobby groups.
Barrier analysis 
Another possibility would be to apply a barri­
er test, where the host Parties’ governments 
identify barriers that prevent the introduction 
of the respective policy. Generally, the intro­
duction of a policy depends on multiple fac­
tors, including a government’s policy prefer­
ences and the country’s political economy.
Political barriers can be expected to play a 
key role. They are, however, difficult to assess
and may need to be analysed policy by policy 
at the national level (Okubo, Hayashi, and 
Michaelowa 2011). By the same token, cul­
tural barriers cannot be operationalized in a 
way that provides the basis for robust addi­
tionality assessment. Technological barriers
might be relevant for the success of a policy – 
for instance, the availability of renewable en­
ergy (RE) technologies will be a precondition 
for a successful RE funding scheme. However,
the absence of this technology does not pre­
vent the government from introducing the 
policy. 
Relevant technical barriers may include data 
availability or limited institutional capacities 
for the introduction and operation of a poli­
cy. Here, international support could make a 
key difference. This, however, raises the ques­
tion of how such support could be provided 
through policy crediting, as it is a results­
based approach were funding is contingent 
on the success of the policy.
NDC-based additionality testing 
Under the Paris Agreement, Parties are given 
significant leeway in defining their NDCs. The 
NDCs submitted to date display great diversi­
ty: While some Parties have submitted GHG 
emission targets, others have adopted non-
GHG targets, combined their GHG emission 
target with non-GHG goals or pledged mere
actions (policies and measures) to mitigate 
climate change. One possibility would be to
focus on NDCs that contain a specific action 
(policy) as a conditional contribution that is
contingent on international support. There 
are, however, some significant concerns with 
this approach. First, there are no clear criteria 
to guide the decision to include a specific
policy in the conditional section of the NDC.
Hence, the definition of conditional policies 
remains an entirely political decision. Second,
such an approach would provide a perverse 
incentive not to include specific policies in
the unconditional part of the NDC. It is there­
fore not in line with the requirement to ex­
pand the reach and ambition level of the 
NDC.
3.1.2	 Can additionality of policies be 
ensured? 
As shown, ensuring the additionality of poli­
cies is extremely challenging. Schneider et al.
(2014) come to the conclusion that for policy­
based mechanisms, it is difficult – if not im­
possible – to develop objective criteria for as­
sessing additionality. The introduction and 
implementation of climate policies usually
depends on the political economy in the 
country and might in most cases be motivat­
ed by several policy objectives not directly 
linked to climate change mitigation. In light 
of these challenges, Schneider and col­
leagues recommend against pursuing credit­
ing of policies (Schneider et al. 2014). While 
we do in principle agree with this observa­
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cle 6.2 gives Parties to the Paris Agreement 
the possibility to cooperate when achieving 
their NDCs. Hence, policies will presumably 
become the basis for such cooperation, mak­
ing it relevant to ensure that cooperation is
robust. 
3.2 Calculating mitigation 
outcomes 
A question closely related to the issue of ad­
ditionality is how to calculate the emission 
reductions achieved by the instrument sup­
ported in the cooperation effort. There are no 
commonly agreed standards for calculating 
the mitigation impact of policies. While a 
common understanding is being fostered 
through recent initiatives from WRI and oth­
ers, standards such as the Policy and Action 
Standard are not suitable for crediting of 
GHG reductions as they lack, among other
things, detailed calculation methods and 
conservativeness (Rich et al. 2014). Hence,
while they can provide a basis on which to 
work, in-depth development of methodolo­
gies is required to ensure the level of certain­
ty needed for crediting policies.   
One critical step in determining the mitiga­
tion outcomes of a policy is to define a refer­
ence (or baseline) scenario and to calculate 
the reference (baseline) emissions. The chal­
lenges associated with setting a robust base­
line have already been discussed in the con­
text of NAMA crediting: While critics maintain
that crediting of policy-based NAMAs will be
unlikely due to the difficulties in setting 
boundaries and baselines (Röser and de Vit 
2012), Michaelowa (2013) points to the fact 
that the challenges are the same for as­
sessing baselines underpinning national
emissions commitments. In his view, policy 
crediting cannot be disregarded on the basis 
of this argument while at the same time al­
lowing countries to develop their national 
targets based on similar assumptions (Micha­
elowa 2013).
Against this backdrop and in order to main­
tain environmental integrity and consistency,
the baseline could be developed using the 
data, assumptions and methods that were 
used in the development of a Party’s NDC 
(Broekhoff et al. 2017). This approach, how­
ever, is only sound if the processes that were 
used to define the Party’s NDC were suffi­
ciently robust.
Hence, what are the steps needed in devel­
oping the baseline of a policy and in calculat­
ing the baseline emissions? First, the bounda­
ries of the baseline scenario as well as the 
most relevant drivers that will presumably 
affect emissions in the absence of the policy 
must be defined. As the policy instrument in­
volved in the cooperation activity will in most 
cases not be the only (planned) climate poli­
cy, the mitigation impact of these other poli­
cies must be taken into account. In addition 
to these (planned) policies, non-policy drivers 
must also be taken into account. External in­
fluences on GHG levels include behavioural
changes, fuel price increases and technologi­
cal advancement (Rich et al. 2014). Despite 
there being various methodological ap­
proaches and respective tools available for 
use in calculating baselines (see: Broekhoff et 
al. 2017), uncertainties will remain. Okubo et 
al. conclude that it might be practically im­
possible or not cost-effective to take into ac­
count all external effects. They therefore 
suggest applying some sort of discounting if
the cooperation activity is to result in credits 
(Okubo, Hayashi, and Michaelowa 2011).
Furthermore, baselines must be regularly up­
dated. To ensure robust updating of base­
lines, the baseline factors that could impact 
the baseline must be monitored throughout 
policy implementation. In terms of govern­
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propose that BAU projections, one of the key 
determinants for the calculation of baselines,
should undergo an international review and 
update process. The applicability of such an 
approach, however, will presumably be lim­
ited to Article 6.4 activities, which will be
overseen by a supervisory body. For coopera­
tion activities under Article 6.2, in contrast,
the Paris Agreement does not envisage in­
ternational oversight.          
Another approach in dealing with external
effects is establishing a control area. A con­
trol area could be a country or region with 
similar characteristics that has not introduced 
that kind of policy. Comparing the develop­
ment in both areas would allow factors to be 
identified that influence the impact of the 
policy. These external factors could then be 
used to update the baseline (Michaelowa 
2013). One challenge associated with this
approach is that it might be difficult to both 
identify a proper control area and define the 
key characteristics that must be consistent 
across both areas. 
3.3 MRV of national policies 
Monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) 
are key processes to ensure the high quality 
of mitigation outcomes. As highlighted by 
Okubo et al. (2011), policies whose mitigation 
impacts are quantifiable, such as trading 
schemes, are generally more suitable for use 
in crediting because the MRV of such policies 
can be output-based (e.g. in tCO2eq/year). In 
contrast, policies with input-based MRV sys­
tems, such as research and development 
support measures, are less suited to crediting 
(Okubo, Hayashi, and Michaelowa 2011).
In generic terms, however, MRV of national
policies might be challenged by political as­
pects. This relates to the question of who will 
be tasked to monitor, report and verify the 
policies as well as to the question of the 
methodologies used in these processes. Gov­
ernments might cite arguments of national
sovereignty to avoid use of internationally 
agreed methodologies and deny non­
governmental entities access to information.
This is particularly relevant for cooperation 
under Article 6.2, which will not be overseen 
by an international body and where Parties 
will only be required to adhere to generic 
guidance.
However, other processes established under 
the Paris Agreement could provide a basis for 
MRVing policies that are supported under Ar­
ticle 6. The enhanced transparency frame­
work established under Article 13 of the 
agreement requires Parties to provide infor­
mation on their climate mitigation action and 
how that action impacts the achievement of 
the NDC. Similarly, the enhanced transparen­
cy framework requires developed countries 
to inform on the support provided. The in­
formation submitted will undergo a technical 
expert review. This transparency framework 
could be used as an anchor for integrating 
MRV processes used in polices supported 
under Article 6. In order to provide the accu­
racy needed for Article 6 crediting, however, 
methodologies must be established that en­
sure MRV processes are sufficiently robust.
The global stocktake (Article 14) and the 
committee to facilitate implementation and
promote compliance (Article 15) could also 
provide the basis for an assessment of poli­
cies. 
3.4 Determining the share out 
between host Party and 
investor Party 
Cooperation under Article 6 could be used to 
serve different purposes: While the use of 
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setting) may be one key driver for acquiring 
Parties to engage, such cooperation may also 
be used as a tool for use in disbursing (re­
sults-based) climate finance. In contrast to 
offsetting, here ITMOs must not be trans­
ferred to serve the purpose. Cooperation un­
der Article 6 may further be used to increase 
ambition in terms of climate change mitiga­
tion (see: Kreibich 2018). Hence, while the 
mitigation impact of the cooperation must 
be clearly determined, the amount of the 
emission reductions to be transferred and the 
amount that will remain with the host Party 
will depend on the purpose(s) of the cooper­
ation activity. It is therefore basically a politi­
cal decision and part of the negotiations be­
tween the Parties involved in the cooperation 
effort. Aspects that could be taken into con­
sideration in this process are:
•	 The amount of mitigation outcomes 
(MOs) the host Party needs to achieve its 
own NDC 
•	 The amount of climate finance the inves­
tor country is willing (and/or expected) to
provide 
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4 Exploring the suitability of 

policy instruments
In the following, we explore three policy in­
struments for their suitability for use in inter­
national cooperation under Article 6.
4.1 Supporting RE Feed-in Tar­
iffs
4.1.1	 Brief description of the policy 
approach 
Feed-in tariffs are among the most popular 
policies to support renewable energy de­
ployment. With feed-in tariffs (FIT), either a 
guaranteed fixed remuneration (fixed pay­
ment FIT) or a price premium on whole-sale
prices (premium payment FIT) is disbursed 
for each MWh of renewable energy fed into 
the grid. 
Costs accrue for the feed-in payments to RE 
plant operators as well as for operating the 
FIT. These costs can, however, only be partial­
ly be financed through the sale of the renew­
able energy. In Germany’s Renewable Energy 
Sources Act (EEG in German), for instance, the 
difference between production costs and 
market value – the EEG surcharge – is borne 
by end users from the public grid, with some 
large consumers being exempt from this
payment. 
Despite their considerable potential to foster 
the deployment of renewable energy, the 
“international funding infrastructure has his­
torically not been flexible enough to support 
national FITs in a broad and programmatic 
way” (UNEP 2012, 6).
4.1.2	 How would international coop­
eration work in this case? 
In principle, there are two starting points for 
the cooperation activity. In case one, the in­
vestor Party A supports the implementing 
Party B in introducing an FIT scheme. It hence 
assists Party B in developing the institutional 
and technical basis for implementing the pol­
icy instrument. This initial support could be 
provided as climate finance without linking it
to the generation of MOs at a later stage. Al­
ternatively, the investor Party A could link 
this initial support to the dispatch of ITMOs 
later on, by signing a purchase contract with 
Party B. Once the system is operational, Party 
A contributes a share of the premium/fixed 
payment per MWh of renewable energy gen­
erated in Party B and receives ITMOs in re­
turn. 
In case two, Party B already has an FIT in 
place. In this case, cooperation involves Party 
A increasing the ambition level of the FIT.
Hence, in order to receive ITMOs, Party A con­
tributes a share of the premium/fixed pay­
ment per MWh renewable energy generated 
in Party B.
4.1.3	 Determining the additionality 
of the policy 
In principle, a policy could be considered ad­
ditional if its costs exceed its benefits 
(Michaelowa and Butzengeiger 2017). One 
possibility of additionality demonstration
therefore is the investment test. A feed-in tar­
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funding from the national budget if the fi­
nancial burden is not to be borne by the end 
users. One option would be to apply the in­
vestment comparison analysis used under 
the CDM. The transferring Party could show 
that the FIT is additional by demonstrating 
that the introduction of the FIT or an increase 
of its support level is economically less attrac­
tive than an alternative policy measure that 
leads to the same additions of power supply.
This approach is particularly well suited if the 
government has analysed alternatives to the 
FIT. 
In their analysis of the Korean FIT, Okubo et 
al. apply the investment test to the individual 
entities participating in the power sector, and 
not to the FIT policy as such. The authors cal­
culate the difference between the FIT and the 
retail electricity price as well as the difference 
between the electricity cost of renewable en­
ergy and that of fossil energy. The investment 
test is passed if both parameters show a posi­
tive value (Okubo, Hayashi, and Michaelowa 
2011). In our view, however, the approach 
applied by Okobu et al. suffers from the fact 
that it is not applied to the policy instrument
level. 
In order to assess additionality of subsidy 
schemes, Michaelowa and Butzengeiger 
(2017) suggest calculating an implicit carbon 
price and then applying specific thresholds to 
assess their additionality, arguing that carbon 
price levels are proportional to the lobbying 
against a carbon pricing system. With a car­
bon price of €5 per tonne of CO2e being polit­
ically feasible, even in emerging economies,
this is used as a threshold to assess addition­
ality, assuming that carbon pricing is not ad­
ditional if the average price lies below €5 
over a period of more than a year.  
A study by Vivid economics calculated the 
implicit carbon price of policies by taking the 
quotient between the total costs that the pol­
icy imposes, and the number of tonnes of 
CO2 saved relative to the counterfactual fossil 
fuel-based generation. The carbon price of 
the policy is then weighted by the share of 
national generation it applies to (Vivid
Economics 2010). Hence, the implicit price of 
carbon is highly dependent on the costs of 
implementing the policy – costs which are 
usually only known ex-post. We do not,
therefore, think this approach is suitable for 
use in demonstrating the additionality of the 
FIT scheme. The application of the invest­
ment comparison analysis, by way of con­
trast, appears far more suitable for use in
demonstrating additionality of the FIT. 
Another possibility involves applying a barri­
er test to the FIT. This test revolves around 
the question of the barriers that have pre­
vented the government from increasing the 
ambition level of an existing FIT or from in­
troducing a FIT in the first place. Depending 
on the type of cooperation involved, Party B 
either must demonstrate that the FIT could 
not be implemented without the coopera­
tion activity (Case 1) or that increasing the 
level of the payments would not be possible 
without it (Case 2).  
Okubo et al. (2011) apply a barrier test to the 
Korean FIT, arguing that the planned substi­
tution of the Korean FIT with a Renewable 
Portfolio Standard (RPS) due to a shortfall of 
public funds made available to the FIT proves 
the additionality of increasing the FIT. In our 
view, this is problematic as the planned in­
troduction of the RPS would also have to be 
taken into consideration when setting the 
baseline and calculating the emission reduc­
tions of the FIT, significantly reducing the 
mitigation outcomes.
4.1.4	 How to determine emission re­
ductions? 
When determining the mitigation impact of 
the policy cooperation, it should be kept in
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yield a proportionate increase of renewable 
energy supply capacity: An analysis by the 
World Bank of FIT-induced wind power has 
shown that higher remuneration levels have 
not necessarily led to proportionally greater 
levels of capacity installation (Zhang 2013).
This can be explained by the fact that higher 
remuneration levels will allow for the installa­
tion of RE power plants in regions that have 
lesser potential. Hence, the increase of supply 
will in most cases not be proportionate with
the increase of the FIT tariff (Obergassel et al. 
2017). Both aspects, however, will not affect 
the determination of emission reductions,
which occurs ex-post.   
In principle, the emission reductions resulting 
from the introduction of a new FIT (or the in­
creased ambition of an existing FIT) can be 
calculated using the following information:
•	 The type and capacity of existing power 
plants  
•	 The electricity generation from the newly 
installed renewable energy capacity 
•	 Indirect emissions from the renewable 
energy operation   
Attribution is an issue, however. While a FIT 
can be expected to support the installation of 
new renewable energy power generation 
plants, the attribution of a certain amount of 
power generation capacity will be difficult as 
some plants might even have been built 
without (an increase of) the FIT. Hence, other 
policies as well as non-policy effects must be
monitored and taken into account when de­
termining the mitigation impact of the policy, 
which can be challenging. Another solution 
in dealing with the impact of other policies is
to define a control area, with similar charac­
teristics in terms of RE potential, financing 
conditions, etc., but without an (increased) 
FIT in place. 
The key indicator used to determine the 
emission reductions will be electricity fed in­
to the grid, which is reported annually.
4.2 Energy EfficiencyWhite 
Certificates 
4.2.1	 Brief description of the policy 
approach 
A white certificates trading scheme is a mar­
ket-based instrument for use in trading cred­
its for energy efficiency improvements. It is 
usually combined with a regulatory instru­
ment that places energy efficiency obliga­
tions (an energy savings quota) on specific
entities thereby creating demand for the 
white certificates. The energy savings quota 
can be imposed on different types of entities,
usually suppliers of energy. The obligation 
does not necessarily have to be limited to the 
electricity sector: In Italy, for instance, where 
the first white certificates scheme worldwide 
became operational in 2005, the energy effi­
ciency obligation is not only placed on dis­
tributors of electricity but also on natural gas 
distribution system operators (Di Santo et al
2014). These entities are required to imple­
ment energy efficiency measures. Alterna­
tively, they can buy certificates from other 
(non-obligated) entities that have imple­
mented efficiency measures. The efficiency 
measures take place at the level of the final 
energy consumers. The efficiency gains result 
in the issuance of white certificates that can 
be used for compliance by the obligated en­
tities. 
4.2.2	 How would international coop­
eration work in this case? 
In principle, there are several ways in which 
white certificates trading schemes could be 
14 	 
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used in the context of international coopera­
tion under Article 6.
In Case 1, Party A supports Party B in estab­
lishing an energy savings quota that is com­
bined with a white certificates trading 
scheme. In Case 2, Party B already has an en­
ergy savings quota in place. However, Party A 
could assist Party B by increasing the quota 
and/or by establishing the white certificates 
scheme on top. Case 3 consists of linking the 
Parties’ white certificates trading schemes.
Such a link could be unilateral, allowing only 
entities from country A to use white certifi­
cates from the system of country B. Alterna­
tively, a bilateral link could be established,
allowing obligated entities from both coun­
tries to use white certificates generated 
abroad. Another option (Case 4) is the direct 
purchase of white certificates from EE pro­
jects in country B by the government of 
country A.
In the following, we focus on Case 3, the link­
ing of white certificates trading schemes, as it
differs significantly from the other cases of 
policy-based cooperation.
Building on research conducted in the con­
text of ETS linking (Beuermann et al. 2017),
we expect that harmonizing some features of 
the white certificates trading systems will be
required, while differences in others could be 
maintained. For instance, both Parties will 
have to align the target type of their white 
certificates systems: They will have to make 
the energy savings quota mandatory and de­
cide whether it will be expressed in primary 
or secondary energy. For other design fea­
tures, mutual recognition will be needed – 
including the cap level, the MRV system and 
potential penalties. Harmonisation of other 
features would not be needed, but aligning 
them could facilitate linking. This also applies 
to the processes for the apportion of obliga­
tions to individual entities and the sectoral
scope of the system (does the system only 
focus on the power sector or also cover other 
energy products, such as gas?). Differences 
could be maintained for some of the other 
features, such as determining obligated enti­
ties and the eligibility of energy efficiency 
projects (technologies/activities, actors, etc.).
In principle, Article 6 could be used in linking 
white certificate schemes in two ways: One 
option is to use Article 6 for the entire linking 
process. In this scenario, each white certifi­
cate would have to be translated into an 
ITMO before being transferred from one 
country to the other. Alternatively, the sys­
tems could be linked independently of ITMO 
transfers. Here, Article 6 is only used as an ac­
counting framework in which ITMOs are 
transferred ex-post, possibly at the end of an 
NDC cycle, to account for the net balance of 
the white certificates transferred. 
The second option described, in which Article 
6 serves as an accounting framework, seems 
easier to implement. This option builds on 
the MRV systems in both schemes that en­
sure that the energy savings (not necessarily 
the GHG mitigation effect) achieved by ener­
gy efficiency projects are equivalent regard­
less of the scheme in which they were gener­
ated. 
In the following example, we assume that the 
energy efficiency project is located in Party B.
Once implemented, the proponent of the 
energy efficiency projects obtains the 
amount of white certificates corresponding 
to the amount of energy saved (depending 
on the target type of the system, these can 
be tonnes of oil equivalent or kWh saved).
The efficiency project proponent then trans­
fers the white certificate to an obligated enti­
ty in Party A in exchange for financial means.
After their transfer, the white certificates are 
used by the obligated entity for compliance 
with its individual saving obligations by 
submitting the required number of (import­
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cates have been transferred to and surren­
dered by the buying company, the net bal­
ance of the transfers can be calculated. This 
net balance is then translated into CO2e and 
can be accounted for using ITMOs.
4.2.3	 Determining additionality of 
the policy 
The additionality of the policy is not an issue 
in the context of linking white certificates 
schemes, as additionality is only relevant in 
the context of policy crediting and we as­
sume that both systems have already been in 
place in advance of the cooperation activity.
There are, however, other relevant determi­
nants of environmental integrity. These in­
clude:
•	 Robust MRV framework and additionality 
rules for energy efficiency projects that 
ensure a high quality of the white certifi­
cates. 
•	 A strong enforcement system that en­
sures compliance by obligated entities.
•	 Ambition of the energy savings quota 
(requirements put on obligated entities).
Policy makers intending to link their own 
white certificates trading scheme with an­
other will have to assess whether the two sys­
tems align in terms of these environmental 
integrity relevant parameters.
4.2.4	 Determining emission reduc­
tions 
The calculation of the emission reductions 
can build on the energy savings determined 
by the individual white certificates schemes.
For the power sector, the energy savings can 
be translated into climate metrics (tCO2e 
avoided) using the grid emissions factor 
(GEF). Since the reduction of the energy de­
mand occurs in the country where the white 
certificate is used, the GEF of the acquiring 
Party must be applied.
For the conversion of energy savings other 
than electricity, a different approach will be 
required. Depending on whether the effi­
ciency project has resulted in a reduction of 
gas, oil, coal or LPG, a specific conversion fac­
tor must be applied. Here again, the conver­
sion factors of the country in which the certif­
icates are used must be applied. This is due to 
the fact that the climate impact of the fuel 
used may vary depending on its source. The 
climate impact of natural gas, for instance, 
depends on whether it was gained through 
conventional drilling or through use of shale 
gas, with the fugitive methane emissions of 
the latter being significantly higher. Other 
factors, such as transport emissions must also 
be taken into account when converting the 
fuel reductions into CO2e avoided.
4.3 EE in Buildings: Improved 
Building Codes and Fund­
ing Schemes for Energy Ef­
ficiency
4.3.1	 Brief description of the policy 
approach 
The buildings sector holds vast emission re­
duction potential, especially when it comes 
to implementing energy efficiency measures.
However, there are numerous barriers – such 
as imperfect information, high transaction 
costs and split incentives – which prevent 
this potential from being tapped. Regulatory 
instruments are important tools for use in
addressing barriers such as these (Intergov­
ernmental Panel on Climate Change 2014).
Energy building codes (also known as mini­
mum energy performance standards (MEPS))
set an upper limit for the allowed energy 
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duced to ban the most inefficient building 
concepts from the market and to ensure a 
minimum level of energy efficiency in the 
building sector. Building codes can be ap­
plied to the construction of new buildings as 
well as to the refurbishment of existing ones 
and be either prescriptive, by setting a stand­
ard for individual components, or perfor­
mance-based, setting thresholds for the 
building as a whole. Prescriptive standards 
and performance-based standards can also 
be combined (bigEE 2018). Building codes 
have historically suffered from low enforce­
ment, leading to actual savings being below 
projections. In addition to strong enforce­
ment, building codes must be regularly up­
dated to account for technological improve­
ments (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change 2014).
4.3.2	 How would international coop­
eration work in this case? 
In the context of NAMA crediting, Michae­
lowa (2012) considers household energy effi­
ciency measures are particularly suitable for 
policy-crediting. In principle, two cases can 
be discerned.
In a first cooperation scenario (Case one), the 
investor Party A is involved in the entire poli­
cy development process of Party B, providing 
funding and technical support in establishing 
the building code and setting up a funding 
scheme. In principle, support can be provid­
ed in all relevant processes, such as data 
gathering and baseline development, estab­
lishment of the national MRV system and de­
velopment of a robust enforcement system
to ensure compliance with the building code.
Once these processes have been established,
Party B can transfer (a share of) the mitigation 
outcomes generated by the building code 
and by the energy efficiency fund in ex­
change for funding.
In a second cooperation scenario (Case two),
the cooperation activity is limited to the 
ITMO exchange process after the introduc­
tion of the building code, which Party B in­
troduces on its own to then transfer (a share 
of) the certified emission reductions to Party 
A in exchange for financial means. The fund­
ing provided by Party A can then be used by 
Party B to re-finance its energy efficiency 
funding scheme and to bear the operational
costs of the building code.
4.3.3	 Determining additionality of 
the policy 
Depending on which of the two cooperation 
scenarios applies, additionality must either 
be demonstrated for the entire policy or only 
for the additional mitigation outcomes gen­
erated through the external funding provid­
ed during the operation of the scheme.
Demonstrating the additionality of the entire 
policy is particularly challenging, as energy 
buildings codes as regulatory instruments 
generally address mitigation options that 
would be profitable but are not adopted due 
to other barriers, such as incentive problems 
or lack of information. This is particularly val­
id for energy efficiency regulations, which are 
associated with significant non-climate bene­
fits and are therefore also referred to as “no­
regret” mitigation options. Hence, an invest­
ment analysis is not feasible in demonstrat­
ing additionality. In order to determine the 
additionality of the policy, Michaelowa and 
Butzengeiger (2017) suggest requiring 
demonstration of “real barriers”, such as lim­
ited access to finance. Here, a barrier analysis 
could be used to analyse the country-specific 
barriers that have prevented the government 
from introducing a building code. In addition 
to economic barriers, Parties could highlight 
specific technical barriers such as lack of high 
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tion. The cooperation activity would then 
have to address these specific barriers.
For the second cooperation scenario, which is
limited to the financial support of the energy 
efficiency fund during the implementation 
phase of the building code, the implement­
ing Party would have to demonstrate that an 
increase in the funding would not be possi­
ble without external assistance. 
4.3.4	 Determining emission reduc­
tions 
Determining the emission reductions result­
ing from the cooperation activity involves 
several steps. First, a baseline scenario must 
be developed that describes the energy con­
sumption without the building code and the 
fund being in place. During the operation of 
the building code, not only must the energy 
consumption be monitored, but also poten­
tial distorting effects such as rebound effects.
In order to calculate the energy savings, the 
energy consumed during the operation of 
the building code and the fund must be 
compared with the energy consumption in
the (updated) baseline scenario. The energy 
savings can then be translated into a climate 
metric using the grid emission factor for elec­
tricity savings and national emissions factors 
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5 Discussion 
and Conclusions
In order to make a significant contribution to 
climate change mitigation, international
market-based cooperation must be scaled 
up, going beyond the project-based ap­
proach used with the Kyoto mechanisms.
Building on the experience gained with the 
programmatic approach under the CDM and 
JI, moving to policy-based cooperation 
seems the logical next step.
Applying the concepts known from the pro­
ject-based Kyoto world to policy-based co­
operation is associated with several chal­
lenges. Among these, ensuring additio­
nality of policies has been identified as the 
key challenge. The problem with testing the 
additionality of policies is that relying on the 
simple assumption of profit-maximizing 
agents is even more difficult for governments 
than for private sector market participants.
From a static perspective, policy-based cred­
iting could focus on mitigation potentials 
that are too costly and provide only limited 
non-climate benefits to the host country, so 
that they will not be targeted by domestic ef­
forts. This, however, changes with the dy­
namic perspective introduced with the Paris
Agreement: A host country could decide to 
implement a policy targeting costly mitiga­
tion options if it expects that this will signifi­
cantly reduce domestic mitigation costs in
the future or lead to large co-benefits in the 
long run.
From this point of view, most climate policies 
are no-regret options and their implementa­
tion should, in principle, be in the interest of 
the host country. In practice, however, tech­
nological, capacity-related and other barriers 
prevent countries from introducing and 
properly implementing these policies. Hence,
from a practical perspective, there is a need 
for external support to be provided and poli­
cy-based cooperation under Article 6 could 
make an important contribution in overcom­
ing these practical challenges.
Other challenges specific to policy-based co­
operation are technical difficulties in robustly 
determining the mitigation outcomes and 
attributing these to an individual policy. In 
political terms, finding an agreement on how 
to share these MOs between the host and the 
investor Party and agreeing on how the poli­
cy will be monitored, reported and verified
can be expected to be particularly difficult.
The ambiguity concerning the additionality 
of policies and the determination of mitiga­
tion outcomes could be addressed by the fol­
lowing options that help reduce the risk of 
adverse environmental integrity impacts. 
First, Article 6 support should be limited 
and target only the initial phase of intro­
ducing policies or increasing their ambition 
level. After this initial phase, the external 
support should be phased-out and mitiga­
tion measures transferred to the domestic re­
sponsibility of the host country.
Second, the mitigation outcomes generated 
through policy-based cooperation under Ar­
ticle 6 should (at least partially) be used 
for climate finance reasons, while use for 
NDC attainment should be limited. Combin­
ing climate finance with carbon finance could 
partially mitigate some of the impacts related 
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tion and robust determination of mitigation 
outcomes.
Furthermore, alternative approaches in us­
ing Article 6 should be explored. The chal­
lenges in robustly determining the addition­
ality of policies as well as the difficulties in 
properly determining their mitigation out­
comes highlight the limitations of the current 
results-based approach while pointing to the 
benefits of alternatives.
Direct government to government transfers 
might be much more straightforward, allow­
ing ITMOs to be transferred on the basis of 
the funding provided (input-based). As long 
as the NDCs of the Parties involved are robust 
enough and their ambition levels sufficiently 
high, this could be much more pragmatic.
Together with more traditional forms of bi- 
and multilateral climate finance, these Article 
6 transfers could assist the host Party in tap­
ping mitigation potentials that cannot be 
targeted through unilaterally funded climate 
action. 
Further research would be needed to explore 
how these two forms of external support,
more traditional forms of climate finance and 
Article 6, relate to each other and how they 
could be designed to maximize synergies 
while avoiding duplications. More broadly,
clarifying the relationship between Article 6 
and climate finance can be expected to also 
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